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M, distrustful might be a more
explanatory word than authoritarian,
I think. Parents with this slant tend to
be stern because they assume that
children, if left to themselves, will be
more inclined to be naughty than
good.... Dr. Benjamin Spock
Over the past 20 years, the view has
emerged that Americans are spending
too much and saving too little, financ-
ing this spending binge, in large part,
with foreign investment. In this view,
we have mortgaged future increases in
our standard of living to foreigners in
return for a spendthrift lifestyle today.
Concerned policymakers have advo-
cated several strategies designed to
force us to save more, such as consump-
tion, gasoline, and import taxes, and
other measures intended to discourage
consumer spending. But before adopt-
ing any drastic proposals, we should
consider carefully whether consumer
spending has, in fact, been excessive.
This Economic Commentary focuses
on demographic changes in the United
States since the late 1960s and their
implications for consumer spending,
debt, and foreign investment. Using the
life-cycle theory of consumption as a
guide, we have calculated a simple,
forward-looking measure of the lifetime
earnings potential of the labor force for
the years 1968 through 1989. Our
estimates show that the inrush of the
baby-boom generation into the
workforce during the 1970s and 1980s
produced a substantial increase in the
aggregate lifetime earnings potential of
U.S. households relative to their cur-
rent labor income, which may help to
explain the otherwise worrisome spend-
ing and debt patterns that developed
over this period.
Furthermore, as the baby-boomers reach
middle age, we should see a reversal in
long-term spending and debt trends—a
turnabout that our estimates suggest
may already be underway.
• We'll Gladly Pay You Tuesday-
Consumer spending as a share of
national income was higher in the
1980s than at any other time during the
last century. In 1987, for example, con-
sumption claimed 82 percent of U.S.
national income—up from 75 percent in
the late 1960s—presumably the highest
spending-to-income ratio of any major
industrialized nation. The flip side, of
course, is the personal savings shortfall:
The U.S. personal savings rate fell from
around 7 percent of national income in
1970 to an average of 4'/2 percent in the
past five years.
While consumers were boldly spending
more and saving less, so, too, was the
federal government. Between 1970 and its
Between the mid-1960s and early
1980s, the age distribution of the U.S.
labor force was changed dramatically
by the inrush of the baby-boom gener-
ation. The authors examine the impli-
cations of this shift for consumer
spending, debt, and foreign investment,
and conclude that, if left to themselves,
consumers will simply outgrow their
apparently spendthrift ways.
peak in 1986, the federal deficit rose
from $12.4 billion to $207 billion, or
from 1 Vi percent to 6 percent of
national income. Although the saving
rates of businesses and state and local
governments actually improved between
those same years—from about 13 per-
cent to 17
3/4 percent—the increases
were insufficient to offset the drop-off
that occurred in household and federal
government saving rates. Over this 16-
year period, national saving (including
households, businesses, and the govern-
ment) dropped from 18'/2 percent of
national income to 15'/2 percent.
This decline coincided with a rise in
U.S. debt accumulation, from 17 per-
cent to 24!/2 percent of national
income between 1970 and 1986. The
run-up in federal government debt over
this period was dramatic, but house-
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hold liabilities, particularly consumer
installment credit, also ballooned. The
ratio of consumer installment debt to
national income rose from about 121/2
percent in the early 1970s to 16
3/t per-
cent by 1986.
It follows that an individual who borrows
more is probably also one who saves less.
Yet, how is it that a nation can borrow
more and at the same time save less?
Where do the funds come from for bor-
rowers to borrow? Enter foreign savers.
In the early 1980s, the United States
ran a large and growing trade deficit,
the result of which was a huge inflow
of foreign capital. But ultimately, all
debts, foreign or otherwise, must be
repaid, and therein lies the problem.
High levels of consumer spending and a
corresponding reduction in personal
saving suggest an investment trend that
is insufficient to satisfy these debts.
The long-term repercussions of foreign
indebtedness depend, in part, on how
these borrowed funds are used. Pre-
vious analysis by this bank indicates
that roughly half of the inflow of
foreign capital during the current
expansion financed higher levels of
investment—namely, business spend-
ing on physical capital and consumer
spending on durable goods and educa-
tion. These expenditures bode well for
future U.S. living standards.
Nevertheless, a significant share of
foreign investment seems to have
financed what we consider to be "pure"
consumption, that is, consumer spend-
ing on nondurable goods and services.
• ... for a Hamburger Today.
A common interpretation of U.S. spend-
ing and debt trends is that a multitude of
Americans are being naughty in their
spending habits, the upshot of which
will be financial hardship at some future
date. In this scenario, spendthrift con-
sumers do not fully appreciate the long-
term implications of their actions. If
they did, they would surely act in a
more fiscally responsible way.
We prefer an alternative explanation—
one that assumes that individuals'
actions are based on a reasonable under-
standing of their current and expected
future financial condition. This explana-
tion employs the life-cycle theory of
consumer spending, where consump-
tion is not bridled by current income but
is instead based on an individual's
expected lifetime earnings.
Consider the average U.S. life cycle.
Workers by and large enter the labor
market between the ages of 18 and 22
and retire from regular employment in
their mid-60s, over which time their
average earnings vary dramatically (fig-
ure 1). Weekly earnings soar during the
first 10 years of an individual's work
life, such that workers in their mid-30s
earn roughly twice as much per week as
those in their early 20s. Weekly earn-
ings remain relatively constant until
workers enter their 60s, at which time
their attachment to the labor market
weakens and they increasingly rely on
accumulated wealth as a source of
income. A commonly accepted expla-FIGURE 3 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS, 1965 vs. 1980
1965 1980
Percent Percent
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
nation for the age/earnings profile
depicted in figure 1 is that the experi-
ence workers gain during the first 10
years of their working lives substan-
tially increases their productivity and,
hence, their income.
We see, then, that a worker's lifetime
earnings potential, or life-cycle earn-
ings, depends crucially upon age.
Young workers have a large lifetime
earnings potential relative to their cur-
rent earnings—first, because they have
a long expected worklife, and second,
because they expect substantial wage
increases as their experience in the
workplace grows. However, spending
patterns do not typically follow the
earnings stream, as consumers attempt
to maintain a more even standard of
living relative to their income over
time. They do this by borrowing against
their expected future earnings from per-
sons who are in a later stage of the life
cycle.
Because of these different patterns of
income and spending over the course of
a life cycle, younger workers tend to
have high levels of spending and debt
relative to their current income, while
middle-aged workers are inclined
toward relatively low levels of spending
and indebtedness. An extreme shift in
the composition of the labor force
toward young workers should induce an
increase in a nation's desired consump-
tion and debt relative to its income, as
the younger workers attempt to borrow
and spend against their expected future
earnings.
As long as a balance exists between
youthful borrowers and middle-aged
savers, harmony in national credit
markets will prevail. But if the level of
desired borrowing exceeds the level of
desired saving (which should have
occurred when the baby-boom genera-
tion entered the workforce), upward
pressure on interest rates will result.
Without an external source of funds,
the rise in interest rates would serve to
ration relatively scarce credit; some
individuals would be prevented from
achieving their preferred lifetime con-
sumption path, and some would "crowd
out" other borrowers—namely, busi-
ness investors. However, in a global
setting, the rise in domestic interest
rates relative to foreign rates produced
by a credit shortfall encourages an
inflow of investment from abroad, thus
allowing a nation to simultaneously
save less and borrow more. Indeed, the
trends in personal savings and net for-
eign investment have been strikingly
similar since 1973 (figure 2).
Therefore, a major shift in the age com-
position of the labor force (not occur-
ring simultaneously in other countries)
can produce changes in international
debt and trade flows, as nations with
relatively younger workers borrow
from nations with relatively older
workers. Consequently, long-term con-
sumer spending and debt patterns can
be misleading if the age distribution of
the labor force is not considered.
• Magical Mystery Tour
Over the 15-year period between 1965
and 1980, the age distribution of the
U.S. labor force shifted dramatically as
the baby-boomers charged into the labor
market (figure 3). In 1965, about 34 per-
cent of all adult workers were under the
age of 34, compared with almost 47 per-
cent by 1980. Meanwhile, the share of
the middle-aged workforce (between 35
years and 59 years) shrank from about
60 percent to 49 percent.To measure the influence of the baby-
boom generation on the growth of life-
time earnings potential relative to cur-
rent income, we constructed an estimate
of the lifetime income potential of the
labor force using annual survey data for
the years 1968 through 1989.
7 The
lifetime earnings potential of an
employed 24-year-old is estimated as the
current earnings of a 24-year-old, plus
the present value of the current earnings
of a 25-year-old adjusted for one year of
productivity growth, plus the present
value of the current earnings of a 26-
year-old adjusted for two years of
productivity growth, and so on, until that
worker retires at an assumed age of 65
years. To find the lifetime earnings
potential of the labor force in any par-
ticular year, we multipy the lifetime earn-
ings potential of each age group in that
year by the number of workers currently
in that age group, and then sum over all
age groups.
We make several simplifying assump-
tions in the construction of these esti-
imates. For example, workers who are
temporarily out of the labor market dur-
ing the annual survey are not included in
our lifetime earnings calculations. Con-
sequently, the data are more sensitive to
the national business cycle than they
should be. We also assume that workers
currently in the labor force expect to
remain there, without interruption, until
age 65. That is, we neither allow for
periods of unemployment (planned or
unplanned) nor for the possibility of
death prior to the age of retirement.
Further, our methodology makes no
adjustment for taxation. We acknow-
ledge that permanent changes in either
income taxation or social security pay-
ments that are perceived as permanent
taxation could lower the lifetime earn-
ings estimate as it applies to pure con-
sumption. However, despite these simpli-
fications, we believe that this series
captures the broad impact of a major
influx of young workers on the potential
earnings stream of the labor force.
Figure 4 shows the lifetime earnings
potential of the labor force relative to
its current income for the years 1968
FIGURE 4 LIFETIME EARNINGS POTENTIAL AND
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through 1989.
1
0 Potential lifetime earn-
ings rose at a rate of 1
 lA percent more
per year than current income between
1968 and 1984, and the ratio of poten-
tial lifetime earnings to current income
rose from about 24>/2 to 29. That is, by
virtue of its relatively youthful stand-
ing, the labor force in 1984 expected
an additional 18 percent—or 4Vi years
—of earnings relative to that expected
by the labor force in 1968. Potential
lifetime earnings peaked in the mid-
1980s and, according to our estimates,
began to decline relative to current
income in 1986.
Trends in the ratio of lifetime earnings
potential to current earnings correspond
roughly with trends in the share of
national income spent on consumer non-
durable goods and services, or "pure"
consumption (figure 4). Indeed, pure
consumer spending as a share of national
income peaked at roughly 71 Vi percent
in 1983, and since 1987, this percentage
has been declining.• They Grow Up So Fast, Don't
They?
In 1986, the oldest members of the
baby-boom generation celebrated their
40th birthdays. Since then, the lifetime
earnings potential of the labor force
has fallen abruptly relative to current
income. This reflects a labor force
near the peak of its age/earnings
profile, with an average age that has
been rising. Consistent with these
trends, the rate of personal saving has
escalated, and we have begun to reduce
our dependence on foreign capital.
The U.S. labor force is expected to
begin aging rapidly. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, the 20- to 34-year-
old age group is projected to fall from
about 43 percent of the working-age
population to around 35 percent over
the next 10 years. As a result, we
project that the ratio of lifetime earnings
potential to current income will dip
from 28 percent to less than 26 percent
between the years 1990 and 2000 (fig-
ure 5). This trend will likely exert
upward pressure on personal saving
rates and downward pressure on real
U.S. interest rates, discouraging foreign
capital inflows in the process.
We believe that a compelling case can
be made for the importance of age
demographics on the determination of
the aggregate consumption appetite of
U.S. households. We recognize, how-
ever, that several important events have
combined to produce the movements in
personal spending and saving and in
foreign debt exhibited over the past 20
years. Such is always the case in a
large and dynamic economy.
There can never be perfect assurance
that our future living standards are
secure. Fortunately, foreigners have
been willing to bet on U.S. invest-
ments—investments that are secured
only by the belief that long-term
economic prospects in the United
States are bright. Circumstantially, at
least, our evidence suggests that rela-
tively high levels of consumer spend-
ing and debt are simply a phase that
we're going through. Don't worry,
we'll grow out of it.
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• Footnotes
1. International comparisons are usually
made in terms of gross product. In 1986, the
ratio of private consumption to gross product
(GNP) for the United States was 66 percent,
compared with 62 percent for the United
Kingdom (GNP), 60 percent for France
(GDP), 58 percent for Japan (GNP), and 55
percent for West Germany (GNP).
2. See Anderson and Bryan (1989).
3. This type of spending is not exactly
"pure," since investment qualities certainly
are associated with some nondurable goods
and services. Moreover, the flow of services
from durable goods, which we exclude,
should rightfully be considered as consump-
tion, as should many components of govern-
ment spending. However, we believe that
trends in nondurable goods and services
spending are a reasonably good proxy for
trends in pure consumption. This assumption
is not uncommon in the consumption litera-
ture. See Hall (1978), for example.
4. This theory was pioneered by Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957),
and later refined by Modigliani and Ando
(1960). The life-cycle theory of consumption
is the foundation of much of the consumer
behavior analysis of the past 30 years, and
for possibly no better reasons than the
theory's basic intuitive appeal and the fact
that consumption patterns seem to be
smoother than income patterns. Despite its
popularity in economic literature, evidence
on the existence of life-cycle consumption
behavior is mixed. We direct the reader to
two persuasive but opposing views: Hall
(1978) uses time-series data to show that con-
sumption patterns are unrelated to current or
recent income patterns, and Carroll and Sum-
mers (1989) use cross-country and cross-
sectional data to demonstrate just the
opposite. The generally contradictory nature
of the life-cycle evidence may be explained
by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), who show
that roughly half of all households appear to
fit the life-cycle profile, while the other half
consumes on the basis of current income.5. The age/earnings profile is dependent on
many factors, important among them the
education, sex, and racial distribution of the
workforce. For a thorough discussion of
these issues, see Mincer (1974). Freeman
(1979) suggests that the age/earnings profile
is also affected significantly by the age com-
position of the labor force, particularly for
male workers.
6. Simulations by Hill (1989) show that the
magnitude of the age shift that occurred in
U.S. labor markets during the 1970s and
1980s was capable of producing a large rela-
tive rise in national spending and inducing an
enormous inflow of foreign capital.
7. Current Population Survey, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
8. The expected long-run rate of produc-
tivity growth is approximately equal to the
discount rate implied by the expected long-
run real interest rate. Therefore, the influ-
ences of these values tend to cancel one
another. Although we experimented with a
range of values, these assumptions had little
overall influence on the patterns outlined
here. For purposes of this study, we assumed
that the expected rate of productivity growth
equals the discount rate.
9. However, the influence of transitory
movements into and out of the labor force is
lessened when our potential lifetime earnings
estimates are presented as a share of current
income.
10. Current income data, calculated as the
sum of the product of current earnings and
employment for all age groups, are taken
from Current Population Survey.
11. From "Projections of the Population of
the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race;
1988 to 2080." Current Population Reports,
Population Estimates and Projections. Series
P-25, No. 1018, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, 1989. We
assume that nominal earnings will rise by 4
percent each year, and that there is a constant
employment-to-population ratio for each age
group over time.
12. This impression is supported by Hill
(1989), who shows that the aging of the U.S.
labor force could produce a trade-balance sur-
plus sometime during the next three or four
years, and projects a positive trade position
that will continue to grow well into the next
century.
13. Some researchers are likely to disagree
with our conclusions. See, for example, Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1989), Brinner (1989),
orKennickell(1990).
14. Prominent among these are measurement
problems, changes in social security and
other pension coverage, and wealth gains.
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